On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and significantly degrading Iranian military infrastructure. His son, Mojtaba Khamenei, has since assumed the position. Iran retaliated with sustained drone, cruise missile, and ballistic missile strikes on Israel, US military bases across the Gulf, and Gulf Arab energy infrastructure, halting oil production in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar and forcing partial shutdowns at Saudi Aramco.
The most consequential Iranian counter-move was the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. From early March, the IRGC Navy began issuing VHF warnings restricting merchant transit, demanding prior approval, boarding and attacking commercial vessels, and laying mines across shipping lanes. The official IMO navigational corridor was abandoned almost entirely. Iran established an alternate route running close to its own coastline past Larak Island, requiring Iranian authorization and, for some vessels by April, transit fees of up to $2 million per ship. Major shipping companies, including Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd, suspended operations. By the end of March, only 154 vessels had transited the Strait, roughly 5% of the pre-war monthly average of 3,000, according to Kpler data. The IEA described the disruption as the largest oil supply shock since the 1970s, with Brent crude peaking at $126 per barrel.
A two-week ceasefire was announced on 8 April. Iran’s Foreign Minister indicated that coordinated passage would be possible, but the IRGC reimposed restrictions within 24 hours, citing an Israeli ceasefire violation in Lebanon. The Islamabad Talks between the US and Iran on 11 and 12 April collapsed without agreement. On 13 April, the US imposed a formal naval blockade of Iranian ports, enforced by over 10,000 personnel and more than a dozen warships, explicitly targeting vessels bound for or from Iranian ports while stating it would not impede freedom of navigation through the Strait for third-country traffic. Iran responded by closing the Strait entirely, describing the US blockade as evidence of bad faith. By 18 April, the US had intercepted or redirected at least 23 vessels while at least 26 others bypassed the blockade line. Iran, in turn, seized commercial vessels, including the Epaminondas, on 24 April. As of 30 April, roughly 2,000 ships remain stranded in the Gulf, and the US estimates it will take up to six months to complete mine-clearance operations. Even if traffic resumes, war risk insurance premiums are projected to run 20 times pre-war levels, according to maritime analysts.
For India, the stakes could not be more direct. Approximately 50% of India’s crude oil imports and 60% of its LPG demand transit the Strait of Hormuz, with nearly 88% of India’s crude sourced from the Middle East overall. At the outset of the crisis, 24 Indian-flagged vessels carrying over 600 seafarers were trapped in the western Persian Gulf. Iran initially allowed India passage as a “friendly nation,” but on 18 April, the Indian-flagged VLCC Sanmar Herald was fired upon by Iranian gunboats showing the risks associated with the current transit regime. The Indian Navy launched Operation Urja Suraksha on 25 March, deploying more than five frontline warships, including destroyers and frigates, to the Gulf of Oman to escort Indian-flagged energy carriers out of the conflict zone. Indian naval vessels did not enter the Strait itself; instead, they stationed at its exit and guided vessels individually along the Iranian-designated northern route. The government also invoked the Essential Commodities Act in the energy sector, instructed refineries to maximize LPG production, and temporarily restricted piped natural gas consumers from purchasing LPG cylinders.
Against this backdrop, CSDR posed the following questions to naval veterans and maritime experts from India.
The actions of both Iran, the coastal state, and the US, the self-appointed guarantor of freedom of navigation, are simultaneously blockading the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most crucial Strait for energy shipping. How does this affect the transit passage regime as a norm of customary international law, and what posture must India adopt before post-war negotiations rewrite the rules?
As a nation dependent on multiple chokepoints it does not control, from Malacca to Bab-el-Mandeb, what lessons must India’s Navy draw from the catastrophic failure of every assumption that underpinned chokepoint security, and is India’s current naval doctrine and force posture adequate for this new reality?