India’s state of deterrence vis-a-vis China has significantly weakened over the last two decades. This has occurred in the backdrop of asymmetries that are both natural (geographic) as well as institutional – economic growth rates, defense production and preparedness. India’s attempts to restore deterrence starting since 2009 has failed to serve its objectives owing to imperfect strategic assessments, over-reliance on non-deterrence measures to ensure stability, and under-investment in military power. Such conditions had led to a deterrence posture that was high on assertiveness but low on credibility. India continues to under-invest in military capabilities and neglect deterrence, even while undertaking significant steps toward creating a military-industrial complex primed for the future. Hence, India needs to restore deterrence – of a kind that is generalized, credible, and based on the buildup of war fighting capabilities. In order to escape the decadal land dilemma, India needs to emphasize its strengths in terms of air power (instead of sea power); and in terms of external options, India could adopt a more flexible version of strategic autonomy. The paper further argues that such a deterrence posture needs to be complemented by a high-level political approach toward a final resolution of the border dispute.