Amid concerns about the shrinking size of Indian Air Force (IAF) squadrons, India is discussing purchasing 12 used Mirage–2000-5 fighter jets from Qatar. Since India already operates close to three squadrons of the slightly less advanced Mirage-2000-H, the induction of the additional jets is likely to be relatively free of complications. Indian officials have also sought to clarify that these jets are not meant to be cannibalized for spares but are meant to be used for flying operations. In another development, the delivery of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk 1A, developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), is expected to begin by the end of July 2024. Initially scheduled for February 2024, the delivery was delayed due to supply chain issues related to engine delivery by GE.
Furthermore, India’s 5th fighter aircraft program for Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is progressing slowly, with a target for induction by 2034. At a time when China and Pakistan’s air force inventory consists of 5th generation fighters (with Pakistan looking to purchase FC–31 5th generation aircraft from China), the AMCA program attains paramount importance for the IAF.
In the next fifteen years, multiple squadrons of the IAF will be phased out, beginning with the three remaining Mig–21 Bison squadrons the following year. To address this shortfall, the IAF ordered 83 LCA Mk–1A, and the Ministry of Defense has approved the procurement of an additional 97 Mk–1A, bringing the total to 180 Mk–1A. Thus, the LCA will constitute most of the IAF’s fighters in the next few decades. However, the present fighter jet programs cannot provide IAF with its 42-sanctioned squadron strength.
India’s need to bolster overall deterrence against China (and the prospect of a two-front war) hinges on air power. Therefore, procurement and investment plans will be crucial to India’s future security and policy toward China in response to the ongoing depletion.
The depletion challenge
With the decommissioning of Mig-29, Jaguar, and Mirage scheduled in the next 10-15 years (amounting to almost 250 aircraft), the IAF will need help to reach the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons. A report by The Print claimed that as per IAF projections, even if all the 36 Rafales, LCA Mk 1 and MK 1A, and two additional squadrons of Su-30 MkI are included, the squadron strength will decrease to 27 by 2032 and 19 by 2042. Additionally, two squadrons of Jaguar and one of Mirage are exclusively reserved for nuclear missions. Currently, the strength of the IAF fleet (31 squadrons) exists only on paper due to the low availability of aircraft, such as Su-30 MkI, which is less than 50%. A media report from 2014, cited the Su-30 MkI’s availability rate as just 48%. The jet is currently undergoing a slow and expensive modernization drive, with greater emphasis on indigenization. Therefore, the purchase of 12 used Mirages from Qatar, along with LCA Tejas, AMCA, and the multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) program for 114 aircraft, underscores the urgent need for the IAF to stabilize its squadron strength.
Deterrence potential of airpower
The military balance on land favors China at the LAC, and practical difficulties in blockading Chinese trade at the Malacca Strait deny India deterrence-enhancing options in the maritime domain. This makes airpower the only way to strengthen deterrence against China, without which India will find itself in an increasingly unenviable strategic position. Notably, the geographical terrain at the LAC provides significant advantages to the IAF, a service that, in turn, has always trained and prepared for deterrence-enhancing ‘bold’ offensive operations. India’s much more numerous number of airfields (and on lower altitudes) also enable both resiliency as well as flexibility. Noting this difference and the psychological disadvantage it imbues in Beijing, Air Marshal Anil Chopra suggests, “The IAF should thus concentrate on neutralizing PLAAF airfields using surface and air-launched missiles and build inventories accordingly”. Reflecting on the role of air power in light of dwindling assets, military historian Arjun Subramaniam describes India’s airpower as the, “only credible coercive deterrent in both conflict prevention and conflict cessation before hostilities spread to multiple domains”.
Thus, if India intends to exploit the operational advantages bestowed by geography and enhanced by doctrine and training against China, it needs to arrest the dwindling squadron strength of the IAF.
Shortfall and rationalization
To make up for dwindling squadron strength, the IAF appears to be rationalizing its assets. This includes bolstering the fleet of armed UAVs and building a multi-layered air defense network to relieve some of the IAF’s assets from the task of aerial interdiction. The IAF has a fleet of Israeli-origin Searcher, Heron Mark-1 and Heron Mark-2 drones, and the upcoming US MQ-9B Reaper and indigenous Tapas drones. Its air defense network consists of Israeli Spyder and Barak-8, Russian S-400 (of which, two remaining regiments are expected to be delivered by 2026-27), and the indigenous Akash.
The original plan of the LCA program was to proceed directly to LCA Mk 2 after LCA Mk 1, with LCA Mk 1A not initially included. Therefore, the decision to develop LCA Mk 1A, incorporating four significant improvements over LCA Mk 1 before LCA Mk 2, represents an interim solution to address the declining squadron numbers. This indicates India’s prioritization of quantity over quality, as highlighted by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report, which pointed out several flaws in the LCA Mk 1.
Furthermore, the IAF has been resisting the theaterisation of the armed forces because it has limited squadrons that it prefers not to divide among various theatres. The IAF emphasizes using airpower for strategic targeting (deep air support) of crucial lines of communication, such as strategic highways and rail lines, logistical bases, etc., rather than close air support on the battlefield. Amid ongoing disagreementsbetween the IAF and the Indian Army (IA) over the division of air assets, the IA is increasingly relying on its own assets to achieve outcomes akin to those of close air support. The Army Aviation Corps now possessesformidable combat strike platforms in the form of drones (Israeli Heron, Hermes, and the upcoming US MQ-9B) and helicopters (upcoming LCH Prachand). The Army has ambitious plans for inducting state-of-the art longer-range precision-guided artillery systems with shoot and scoot capabilities that could replicate CAS missions – a global trend reenforced by the lesson of the Russia-Ukraine war. This increased self-reliance on the IA’s part also frees the IAF to focus on its preferred and core missions.
Challenges ahead
The shrinking squadron size of the IAF reflects the implications of India’s past indecisiveness about aircraft production/procurement programs. Thus, if India wants to achieve the three mutuals with China —mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interests—as reiterated by EAM Jaishankar in his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the SCO summit, formidable investments in airpower and its rationalization will be the hinge factor. Currently however, India is resorting to adhoc measures to address the depletion of squadrons.
The IAF will face increasingly challenging and stretched circumstances over the next decade, given the growing security challenges across the LAC. As such, future iterations of India’s plans for theaterisation, the IAF’s strategic doctrine, and a potential National Security Strategy (NSS) should address this ongoing challenge of depletion in the face of growing threats.