The US/Israeli war on Iran was paused through a two-week ceasefire on April 8, 2026. Since February 28, these strikes have killed multiple Iranian political and military leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and have significantly degraded Iranian military capabilities. However, Iran’s retaliation has maintained a steady rate of fire (of drones and cruise/ballistic missiles) and has successfully imposed an implied blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran insists that the Strait is open to states except the US and Israel. Still, the threat of attacks alone has caused a spike in war risk premiums, which has been sufficient to dissuade crossings without Iranian authorization. Moreover, the Islamic Republic has proved resilient, with military operations and political decision-making showing continuity despite the loss of key leaders.

Since the war began, Israel has adopted a strategy of inflicting maximum pain, with strikes on Iranian energy facilities, education institutions, hospitals, and cultural edifices alongside consistent strikes on military, nuclear, and desalination facilities. US strikes have alternated among these targets, amid constantly shifting war aims. Iran’s retaliation strategy has focused on horizontal escalation, designed to extract severe international economic costs as a result of continuing US/Israeli bombardment. Iran has struck all GCC states thus far, focusing on US military infrastructure in these states, which is being used in strikes against Iran. However, Tehran has also struck major energy hubs in Gulf Arab states, reciprocating Israeli attacks on Iranian energy. This has caused oil production in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar to grind to a halt, and Saudi Aramco has partially halted operations, while the UAE faces a cross-sectoral crisis due to Iranian attacks targeting the Emirates with larger volleys.

Presently, Washington has imposed an April 6 deadline on Tehran to reopen the Strait, and has (effectively) threatened ground action should Iran fail to comply. However, Tehran views this conflict as categorical evidence of Washington’s bad faith, given that February 2026 was the second time the United States attacked Iran in the midst of negotiations, and despite Iran’s effective acceptance of most demands in Muscat.

The US/Israeli war on Iran was paused through a two-week ceasefire on April 8, 2026. Since February 28, these strikes have killed multiple Iranian political and military leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and have significantly degraded Iranian military capabilities. However, Iran’s retaliation has maintained a steady rate of fire (of drones and cruise/ballistic missiles) and has successfully imposed an implied blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran insists that the Strait is open to states except the US and Israel. Still, the threat of attacks alone has caused a spike in war risk premiums, which has been sufficient to dissuade crossings without Iranian authorization. Moreover, the Islamic Republic has proved resilient, with military operations and political decision-making showing continuity despite the loss of key leaders.

Since the war began, Israel has adopted a strategy of inflicting maximum pain, with strikes on Iranian energy facilities, education institutions, hospitals, and cultural edifices alongside consistent strikes on military, nuclear, and desalination facilities. US strikes have alternated among these targets, amid constantly shifting war aims. Iran’s retaliation strategy has focused on horizontal escalation, designed to extract severe international economic costs as a result of continuing US/Israeli bombardment. Iran has struck all GCC states thus far, focusing on US military infrastructure in these states, which is being used in strikes against Iran. However, Tehran has also struck major energy hubs in Gulf Arab states, reciprocating Israeli attacks on Iranian energy. This has caused oil production in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar to grind to a halt, and Saudi Aramco has partially halted operations, while the UAE faces a cross-sectoral crisis due to Iranian attacks targeting the Emirates with larger volleys.

Presently, Washington has imposed an April 6 deadline on Tehran to reopen the Strait, and has (effectively) threatened ground action should Iran fail to comply. However, Tehran views this conflict as categorical evidence of Washington’s bad faith, given that February 2026 was the second time the United States attacked Iran in the midst of negotiations, and despite Iran’s effective acceptance of most demands in Muscat.


Is this conflict a stress test for the US-led order in West Asia — and what does India’s response signal about its own vision for multipolarity?


How should India balance its deepening defense partnership with Israel against its historically functional ties with Iran — and is that balance still tenable?

Contributions by:

Prof. Happymon Jacob

Lt Gen D S Hooda (retd)

Prof. C Raja Mohan

Amb. Rakesh Sood

Amb. Gaddam Dharmendra

Amb. Ajay Bisaria

Amb. Anil Trigunayat

Amb. DP Srivastava

Amb. TCA Raghavan

Dr. Deepika Saraswat

Dr. Stanly Johny

Col. Rajeev Agarwal

Dr. Khinvraj Jangid

Dr. Smruti Pattanaik

Prof. Kingshuk Chatterjee

Bashir Ali Abbas