The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 has had a dramatic impact on the broad outlines of Indian foreign policy and strategic thinking. India’s rationale for adopting an approach of strategic autonomy (albeit imperfect and contested) was strongly shaped by two salient factors. Firstly, a war in Eastern Europe did not clearly impact India’s core geopolitical interests. Secondly, the primary aggressor in the war happened to be a close strategic and defense partner of India, thereby limiting India’s room for movement. However, a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan represents a qualitatively different geopolitical dilemma for India. Unlike Russia, China is India’s primary great power adversary and one with whom India has shared a border that is both disputed as well as conflict-prone. Additionally, India’s closest strategic partners (such as the Quad) will expect greater Indian understanding and cooperation during a crisis/conflict in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. India also has deep stakes in preventing both conflict as well as a takeover of Taiwan for India, given that such contingencies will have excruciating economic and geopolitical costs. A Chinese takeover of Taiwan, after all, is likely to push the U.S. towards isolationism while also freeing up China’s military to focus its attention and resources towards India both in the Himalayas as well as in the Indian Ocean.

For such reasons, India’s wider strategic commentary has been emphasizing the importance of Taiwan’s continued autonomy to India’s core strategic and security interests.1 What is less clear still, however, is how a future Indian government is likely to interpret, understand and respond to a cross-strait conflict. Will India choose extreme caution despite the high stakes? Or, will it choose to assist and cooperate with strategic partners within realistic limits? As importantly, how will India factor in concerns over possible Chinese retribution? Would India’s decision-making be shaped to a large degree by its perception of U.S. and Japanese resolve?

Needless to say, Indian decision-making will have to factor in expectations from strategic partners and their broader strategic need of being able to shape PRC choices and behavior. Hence, a useful way to gauge various trade-offs and dilemmas Delhi will face is to place Indian decision makers within a setting that involves the evolving crisis in the straits, Chinese diplomacy as well as the diplomatic conversations between India and its like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific. The upcoming planned simulation exercise is supposed to help in understanding how various policy objectives and considerations are likely to interact during a real cross-straits crisis.

This diplomatic wargame had one primary objective – To understand, and in a context-sensitive and integrated manner, the broader policy approaches that will be available to India during a future cross-straits contingency in the not too distant future. The secondary objective consists of understanding the nature of the strategic communication (as well as diplomacy) between India and its strategic partners (U.S. and Japan) during such a crisis.

Experts